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1 
Abstract 
What happens when governments that have benefited from programs to redistribute money from 
richer to poorer states are faced with the prospect of being redefined as a “richer state” 
themselves?  In recent years, such a situation has confronted the traditionally poorer states of 
Western Germany and the traditionally poorer nations of the European Union.  Both have had to 
worry that systems of financial solidarity that benefited them in the past might change to benefit 
a new set of potential (and arguably needier) recipients.  In the German case, reforms of the tax 
equalization system might channel funds to the new eastern Länder while in the EU case, 
reforms of the structural funds might channel funds to states in Central and Eastern Europe.  It 
turns out that funding was generous in the East German case but decidedly not in the CEE case. 
Why? Neither partisanship nor feelings of solidarity towards these “poor cousins” seem to have 
much explanatory purchase. Rather, the strong institutional positions of the traditionally poorer 
states in both cases, meant that the key factors shaping the outcomes are the electoral exposure of 
the respective central governments and the presence or absence of hard budget constraints on that 
political center.  The differences in process and outcomes have important implications for the 
study of federalism. 
 
 
Thanks to Arthur Gunlicks, Craig Parsons, Stephen Silvia, Helga Welsh, Dirk Wentzel, and 
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2 
It is increasingly common to refer to the European Union as a political system that can be 
analyzed using the same tools of comparative politics that are widely used for individual states. 
This “governance” approach to the EU emphasizes features such as party politics, executive-
legislative interaction, and judicial independence, that can be analyzed using the same theories 
and concepts that one would use to compare individual nation states.
1 Curiously, the governance 
approach generally has not used federalism as one of the core concepts to analyze the EU.
2 
Likely, this is because while it is plain that while the EU institutions have federal aspects, they 
also have intergovernmental, supranational, confederal, and functional elements as well. And yet 
some recent theorists of the EU emphasize that it “increasingly resemble[s] an emergent federal 
polity.”
3  
The purpose of this paper is to compare one system that is unarguably federal – the 
Federal Republic of Germany – with the quasi-federal EU. The comparison takes place along 
only one dimension and so is necessarily limited. But the dimension is both important and little-
studied: the economic incorporation of new peoples into an existing federal (or, in the EU case, 
quasi-federal) political system. This situation is rare, but potentially of major importance, as it 
may upset crucial bargains struck over years and even decades. Many federal systems, including 
both Germany and the EU, have some provisions for what might be called “economic solidarity” 
across their constituent units. That is, many federal systems internally share some part of their 
wealth with one another.  
But what happens when governments that have benefited from programs to redistribute 
money from richer to poorer states are faced with the prospect of being redefined as a "richer 
                                                             
1 Hix 1999, 2005 has been among the foremost advocates of this approach. 
2 Indeed, federalism appears only once in the index to Hix 2005, which I take to be exemplary of the governance 
approach. 
3 For example, Burgess 2004: 26. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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state" themselves?  I look at two recent cases where this has happened: a system of payments to 
German states that undergirds fiscal federalism inside Germany and a system of payments to 
European regions -- the EU's Structural Funds. Both systems involved better-endowed political 
units making side payments to less well-endowed units in exchange for their participation in 
broader efforts to organize a national polity (case 1) and supranational markets (case 2). In both 
cases, even poorer claimants -- East German Länder and Eastern European countries -- have 
joined the redistribution systems. Thus both the traditional givers and takers have to deal with the 
arrival of the "poor cousins" from the East.  In both cases, systems that were set up as payments 
to one set of beneficiaries essentially became redistribution mechanisms that needed to include 
new beneficiaries not party to the original bargain.  
The first case centers on a set of poorer states in the old West Germany.  These states – 
Schleswig-Holstein, Rhineland-Palatinate, Bremen, Lower Saxony, and the Saarland – had long 
received “tax equalization” payments from the richer West German states.  The payments 
ensured that all states had roughly equal per capita tax revenues with which to work. Yet when 
five new Eastern German states appeared at the system’s doorstep, these “poorer” Western states 
were faced with the prospect of becoming givers in a system where they had previously been 
takers.  How would they respond? 
The second case centers on the poorer member states of the European Union.  These 
states – Spain, Greece, Portugal, and Ireland – had long received “structural funds” from the EU 
meant to narrow economic differences within the Community.  Specifically, any region of any 
EU country whose GDP per capita is less than 75% of the EU average is entitled to apply for the 
main fund. In the four countries named, a majority of the regions meet these categories, and 
these countries have been the largest recipients of EU structural funds over the past decade.  Yet waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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with deliberations to enlarge the EU to include a number of countries – including ten poor ones 
mostly in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) – these receivers have also been faced with the 
prospect of becoming givers in the very near future.  As we will see, however, the poor cousins 
from East Germany fared considerably better than those from Eastern Europe. In fact, while 
Germany shoveled cash at its Eastern states right from the start, the EU had to create, in the last 
days of negotiations over membership, a “special payment facility” to benefit several CEE states 
in order to ensure that they would not become net payers into the EU right from the start of their 
membership in May 2004. 
Despite the very different outcomes, four similarities give shape to the comparison: first, 
both programs involve substantial transfers.  In the German case, until recent reforms, the states 
with the lowest tax revenues were guaranteed up to 99.5% of the average tax revenues of all 
German states.  States that collected tax at rates far above the national average could retain only 
up to about 103% of that average and had to pass on the rest to poorer states.  In the EU case, 
each year well over 30 billion Euros are passed along to poor regions.  Second, both programs 
involve very extensive, bureaucratic criteria.  The German system is so complex that it is often 
joked that there is only one person who understands the system – though he can’t explain it – and 
one person who can explain the system – though she doesn’t understand it.
4  In the EU case, the 
regulations are very precise, and regions often lose funding because of technical mistakes in their 
applications.
5  Third, both programs involve sub-regions of national states.  In Germany, we deal 
with first eleven and then, after unification, sixteen federal states.  In the EU, we deal with so-
called NUTS II regions that meet EU standards for becoming recipients of structural funds.
6 
                                                             
4 More seriously, the best recent English summary is Färber, 2003. In German, see Lintner, 2004; Seybold, 2005. 
5 European Information Service 2006. 
6 NUTS = la Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques — EU defined regions for statistical and analytical 
purposes. These regions sometimes are and sometimes are not constitutional regions or states.  waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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Finally, in each case, the old poor states held enough institutional high ground to avoid seeing 
their benefits be redirected to new recipients. If the poor cousins were to be helped, it would not 
come out of their hide.   
Despite these similarities, many differences cannot be controlled for, not least that one 
case is almost purely domestic while the other has important elements of supranationalism. But 
then this is one of the points of the paper: such differences still matter greatly and must inform 
our judgments on the extent to which the EU is a system of “emergent” federalism. With this in 
mind, the rest of this paper makes three arguments aimed at establishing a plausible argument for 
the pattern of variation. First, it quickly excludes both fraternal sentiment and partisanship as 
plausible explanations for the difference in outcomes. Second, it shows that while arguments 
about fears of migration are plausible and likely played some role, they are not adequate to 
explain the observed pattern. Third, it argues that the best explanation flows from a combination 
of two factors, which, for shorthand, I label electoral exposure and budgetary discretion. The 
paper’s conclusion links both of these factors to the difference that flows from being an 
established federal system. 
The paper is premised on a fairly simple demand and supply model of politics. 
Essentially, I will quickly show that each set of poor cousins was eager to garner material 
benefits from their new political community and that the old poor were not enthusiastic about 
helping meet those claims. This claim is not controversial, and I do not dwell on it. But if the 
demand for relief was broadly consistent across cases, both the channels of expression for that 
demand, and the supply of relief varied.
7  More specifically, I argue that material relief was 
                                                             
7 A caveat on the demand side is that German solidarity takes the form of tax revenues, which are highly fungible; 
once captured, state governments can use these revenues for any legal purpose.  EU solidarity takes the form of co-
financing of approved projects for public, private, or human capital formation.  There are very strict rules governing 
the use of these funds, and many long time members cannot take advantage of some of the monies to which they are waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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supplied by the German federal state for three primary reasons: successive governments were a) 
exposed to the electoral force of East Germans’ demands for relief as of October 1990 at the 
latest; b) institutionally constrained from forcing the older poor states to bear much of the new 
burden; and c) legally able to address the demands with debt financing. So the federal 
government paid the poor cousins in Eastern Germany. By contrast, the European Union gave 
less than in previous enlargements and less than was expected by CEE populations because a) it 
was protected from any electoral exposure until May 2004; b) also institutionally constrained 
from passing the new burdens onto its old poor states; but c) legally unable to address the new 
demands with debt financing. So the poor cousins in CEE were disappointed. 
This explanation leaves out two variables that might have been expected to play some 
role. The first is partisanship. It is certainly thinkable that this might have mattered because of 
differences in how payments were distributed. In Germany, states are either payers or receivers.  
In the EU, however, individual nations both pay and receive from the funds (even wealthy EU 
countries receive some structural funds, though not those earmarked for the weakest regions).  
This difference simplifies political calculations for the German states because they are either 
payers or recipients, a position that seems to shape their views regardless of the shifting partisan 
makeup of their governing bodies, a point we see demonstrated below. In the EU, by contrast, 
the partisan composition of each member state government might plausibly have mattered more 
because different parties might read differently the complex basket of gains and losses that occur 
when the gains to “their” recipients of EU funding are pitted against the losses to “their” 
domestic taxpayers. But in the event, it did not work out this way. Rather, governments of both 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
entitled because specific projects cannot meet these high standards.  Thus, “winning” in Germany provides cash 
while winning in the EU provides assets contingent on subsequent political decisions. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
both sets of poor cousins were very eager to receive solidarity payments, which is why this paper stresses waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
 
7 
right and left pursued the same policies in, for example, Spain, as both the Gonzalez and 
Zapatero (left) and Aznar (right) governments tenaciously defended entitlements for Spanish 
regions.
8  
A second potential explanation is that we would expect more solidarity in the case of a 
single national community, while we would expect in the EU case to see side payments carrying 
minimal payoffs depending more strictly on bargaining leverage.
9  It seems plausible to think 
that domestic interactions incorporate more identity and norm-legitimacy concerns than 
international ones; even those that see identity and legitimacy as generally important everywhere 
would probably expect empirically that intra-German ties and obligations should be stronger than 
those between, say, Spain and Poland.  Yet surprisingly little evidence bears this out. In 
Germany, the pattern of funding does not track public opinion towards the East at all.
10 
Significant resentment towards the “Ossis” had built up by the time when some key deals were 
cut to keep the system intact. West German attitudes were neither euphoric nor fraternal when it 
came to dealing with the East by the mid-1990s.
11  Rather than evidence of widespread warm, 
filial sentiments, the literature underscore West German concerns that these “other Germans” be 
brought up to western economic, political, social and cultural standards as quickly as possible. 
Meanwhile, Spanish public opinion was among the most supportive of Eastern enlargement in 
any of the old member states. We will see, however, that these public stances explain neither the 
substantial generosity of the West Germans, nor the striking obstructionism of the Spanish 
government, which caused more difficulty for the new EU members than any other state.   
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
differences in their ability to make their demands politically effective and differences in the political center’s ability 
to respond. 
8 Spain, as the largest recipient of the structural funds, is treated here as exemplary of the attitudes of broader group 
of the old poor.  
9 See Moravcsik and Vachudova 2003. 
10 See the data in Glaeser, 2000: chapters 1 and 2. 
11 Boyer, 2005; Glaeser 2000. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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A third possibility, less easily dismissed, is that the fear of migration explains the more 
generous West German policies. Such fears clearly did exist.
12 It is also true that the EU had 
available a tool that Germany did not: a ban on migration from the new member states for a 
period of up to seven years after full membership. But while this possibility is broadly consistent 
with the outcome, it leaves much unexplained. Specifically, if migration alone was driving West 
German public policy, why was it that this fear only affected the federal government and not the 
state governments? Most of the old poor states were located right on the boundary between East 
and West, and yet we have evidence below that they wouldn’t pay for anti-migration programs if 
that meant giving up their entitlements. Their preference was to have Berlin pay, and because it 
did, it is hard to know if the old poor would have preferred lower benefits to higher migration. 
Similarly, we can’t know if the EU’s final offers on structural funds for CEE would have been 
more generous had they not already put in place the possibility of a seven-year wall against 
migration. But it is just as plausible to argue that one reason EU member states – Germany and 
Austria above all – demanded the barrier is because they knew just how little structural fund aid 
was designated to flow to CEE in the first years after their membership. Certainly, the indicators 
of a skimpy deal on the structural funds preceded, rather than followed, the preparations for the 
subsequent migration deal.
13 
Finally, a puzzle also emerges from the fact that one system is reformed and the other is 
not.  In the German case, the poor cousins arrived at a time when the system was already under 
major stress and when there were fiscal, political, and judicial pressures for change. In the EU 
case, the poor cousins arrived in the wake of an apparently successful engagement with 
transitioning democracies in Iberia and with economic backwardness in Ireland. Yet it was in 
                                                             
12 One economist actually published a paper entitled “Why does anybody live in Eastern Germany?” waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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Germany where the system was more or less retained intact and the EU level where wholesale 
changes were introduced (e.g. partial access). How do we explain this? Why would the richer 
German states, who had long complained about the tax equalization system, acquiesce as it was 
transferred to Eastern Germany? Why would Germany, which did more than any other EU 
member state to promote EU enlargement, be complicit in such stingy EU support for Eastern 
Europe?  
The answers to these questions lend further credence to the idea that electoral dynamics 
and the room for maneuver of the political center – Berlin or Brussels – goes farther towards 
explaining the outcomes than do attitudes about solidarity or partisanship. Both systems had their 
critics. But in these cases, the demand for reform was much less important than the supply of 
reform. The broad argument of the paper is that only under conditions where one constituency 
was willing to pay to break the log-jam was reform possible. In the German case, that 
constituency was found in the federal government – once under CDU leadership in 1990-91 and 
again under SPD leadership in 2001.  In the EU case, no such patron has been found.  Absent a 
comprehensive reform, ad hoc policies must be negotiated, and the poor cousins – as one would 
expect – have very little leverage in these ad hoc agreements. Thus, in one case, the poor cousins 
from the east have been clothed and fed in a fairly generous manner; in the other, they must cope 
with the somewhat bitter realization that after long efforts to make themselves ready for EU 
membership, the benefits of that membership will not be what they originally anticipated. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section describes the German 
system of tax equalization from its historical roots through the last major reform in 1969. The 
third section then traces and evaluates the efforts to reform and extend the system to Eastern 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
13 If true, this would imply that as the barriers come down later this decade, we should expect the structural funds 
may grow more generous towards CEE member states. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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Germany.  The fourth section describes the EU structural funds system, and the fifth traces the 
contentious debates over its reform in light of efforts to enlarge the EU.  In that debate, Spain has 
taken the lead in trying to assert the financial position of the traditional recipient nations/regions.   
 
The German System of Tax Equalization: The Federal Government’s Trojan Horse 
Historically, Germany has had no settled pattern of taxation powers. Under the 1871 Reich 
Constitution, taxation authority lay broadly with the states, but the Weimar constitution of 1919 
gave the central state the right to collect and allocate most taxes.  To compensate, however, 
Weimar Germany developed a tax equalization system judged by one of its foremost students to 
be “very elastic and [to allow] flexible policy making.”
14  Nevertheless, the states were pushed to 
the periphery of the taxation system in the Weimar period. If anything, the Nazis radically 
accelerated the trend toward central state control of taxation, as, after 1934, they controlled all 
relevant taxes.   
Postwar Germany famously opted for a federal structure.  Every federal system needs a 
fiscal architecture to make meaningful its rules and division of competencies.  In the main, the 
story of tax financing in the Federal Republic is a story of the federal government attempting to 
divide and conquer the states.  The FRG is an unusual case in that its states, while initially 
collecting most taxes, cannot set their own rates.  Further, while state executives, through the 
upper house (Bundesrat), have significant influence in setting the uniform rates that prevail 
across the whole country, state legislatures generally have much less – a source of significant 
tension.
15  Another special situation is the system of tax equalization, called the 
Länderfinanzausgleich (LFA).  The LFA makes an important difference in the amount of the 
                                                             
14 Renzsch, 1991, p. 21. 
15 OECD, 1999, pp. 76-79. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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money that each state has to spend.  In 1951, for example, the weakest land, Schleswig-Holstein, 
would have had 112 DM per person in state spending.  But because of the LFA (at that point 
informal and not yet codified), the state was able to spend 153 DM per capita in 1951, an 
increase of 36%.
16   
The LFA system is not in the German constitution, but rather emerged from the fact that 
the Länder are obliged by the constitution to perform a variety of different functions and to 
equalize “living conditions” in all parts of the country.  For the poorest Länder, however, the 
money available often was not enough to meet these obligations.  Absent the LFA, these states 
would have almost no discretionary spending and almost no political room for maneuver.  As a 
consequence, prior to the creation of the LFA, the poor states were more or less obliged to call 
for federal help to meet their obligations.  When they called for federal help, the richer states had 
to fear that the federal government would usurp state competencies (at least in the poorer states) 
in exchange for its financial support.  Indeed, the federal state used weak states to carve out more 
influence throughout the 1950s and 1960s.
17  In other words, the bargain of national versus state 
responsibilities included a set of side payments that allowed poorer states to fulfill their 
obligations but at the cost of national involvement in their policymaking domains. 
How exactly did the federal government use the weak states as its Trojan horse?  Early in 
the post-war period, the federal CDU governments developed a pattern of offering direct 
“categorical grants” to the Prime Ministers of the financially weakest states.
18  The logic of this 
federal assistance was two-fold.  First, it promoted the dependencies of individual weaker states 
on the federal government.  Second, it undermined the solidarity of the states, and it opened up 
avenues for more federal intrusion into state policy making domains.  In response, a second set 
                                                             
16 Ibid., p. 14. 
17 Ibid., pp. 75-169. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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of side payments emerged in with the richer states exercised “preemptive solidarity” to try to 
keep the federal state from intervening too deeply.
19  The result was a system of “horizontal” 
redistributions from richer to poorer states.   
  By the time of the first major codification and reform of the LFA system in 1955, the 
poor states were guaranteed at least 88.75% of the average per capita tax revenues.
20   In 1955, 
the states considered formalizing “vertical” payments from the federal government in Bonn but 
rejected the idea because the states calculated that Bonn would probably find some way to 
recapture those revenues from the tax resources it shared with the states.
21  As a consequence, 
strong states often tried to deny any legal basis for direct federal payments to weak states, and 
they did so to stop the erosion of state competencies.
22  Yet the richer states were never able to 
use the horizontal payments to completely end the connection between the federal government 
and the weaker states, though Bonn’s vertical payments were generally ad hoc and sometimes 
lacked a secure legal basis. Horizontal tax equalization grew gradually, and by 1958, the weakest 
states were guaranteed at least 90% of the income and corporate tax receipts of the richer states.   
  LFA reform in 1969 made the system even more redistributive.  In 1970, the first year in 
which the new system was put into place, available revenues ranged from 95.6% of the national 
average for the weakest states to a ceiling of 104.7% for the strongest states.  Clearly, the gap 
was narrowing.  The 1969 reform also ended the formal bilateral deals between the federal 
government and individual states.  The new system thus strengthened the group of states, though 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
18 Ibid., p. 99.  
19 Adelberger, 2000, pp. 61-2. 
20 In 1950, Schleswig-Holstein, the poorest state, was at 71.3% of average revenues after equalization, and 
Hamburg, the richest was at 122.3%.  In 1959, the lowest was Lower Saxony, at 91% and Hamburg was again the 
highest at 117.8%.  In 1970, the lowest was Bremen at 95%, and the highest again, Hamburg, at 104.7%.  In 1983 it 
was 98% for Lower Saxony, and 105.2% in Hamburg. Renzsch, 1991, p. 282. 
21 Between the 1955 and 1969 reforms, the states received about 65% of the combined income and corporate taxes, 
while the federal government received around 35%.   
22 Renzch, 1991, p. 129. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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individual states lost their ability to cut side deals with the federal government.  And the federal 
government saw diminished the divide and conquer tactics that it had perfected over the past 25 
years.
23  Yet at the same time, the reform carved out a new space for vertical redistribution in the 
form of “joint tasks” shared by the federal government and the state and “mixed financing” to 
underwrite such tasks.  No longer did federal grants require states to provide matching funds.  
The rich states saw this new tool as a way to garner federal money of their own and thus to 
achieve some financial compensation for the inroads the federal government had made into their 
policy domains. 
 
From Trojan Horse to Sacred Cow: Reforming the Länderfinanzausgleich  
With the coming of German unification it became clear that the LFA system, fundamentally 
unreformed since 1969 and generating resentment on several fronts, would have to be reformed.  
Though some considered the system unreformable, if the five East German states had simply 
joined the LFA system under the existing rules, the amount of money redistributed would have 
had to rise from 3.5 billion DM per annum to about 20 billion DM in order deal with the 
financial inadequacies in Eastern Germany.
24  The focus of this section on the reform of the LFA 
is on the weak Western states, for they were the ones that most had to fear being shifted from 
receivers to payers.
25  Indeed, if the LFA were to remain unreformed, every West German state 
but Bremen would have become a net payer.   
  In response to this dilemma, Bonn – still the capital at this stage –  and the Western states 
                                                             
23 Renzch, 1991, pp. 258-259. 
24 For the argument that a “rationality trap” makes the system well-nigh unreformable, see Färber and Sauckel, p. 
673 and passim. 
25 Ziblatt (2000, p. 20 and 35-6) shows how the richer Western states tried hard to cast the dispute about reform in 
terms of North versus South rather than as East versus West. For a time in 1998, it even appeared that the CDU-led 
Eastern states of Saxony and Thuringia might join with CDU and CSU-led Western states in supporting system waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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agreed to put off admitting the new states to the LFA until 1995.
26  Instead, they set up and 
financed more or less equally the Fund for German Unity.  The Fund had the dual function of 
distributing the debt inherited from the GDR and also seeking to limit the West German states’ 
liability for rebuilding Eastern Germany.
27  For example, the Western states used the Fund to 
argue that East Germany should have a separate turnover tax system that would distribute the 
turnover taxes raised in their territory on per capita basis, but not the turnover tax rates from the 
entire territory of the now larger FRG.  Thus the weaker Western states helped undermine the 
intent of the 1969 law, which had had been using the turnover tax as a way of increasing the 
solidarity of the entire LFA system.  The irony, of course, is that these states were precisely the 
ones that had argued for such a provision in 1969.  This time, however, the weaker Western 
states had a ready partner in the stronger ones, and the Unity Treaty of August 31, 1990 set the 
East German access to the turnover tax at 55% for 1991 and proposed to raise it slowly to 70% 
by 1994.   
  Of course, the GDR government, which negotiated this treaty, showed little capacity to 
counter the disadvantages for the new states that would emerge on its territory.  This first 
maneuver came before the collapse of the East German economy.  As the first wave of layoffs 
came in the summer of 1991 and as the now-elected East German state prime ministers could 
represent their own interests in federal-state negotiations, it became clear that they had no 
realistic foundation for public finance.  The old states relented and reversed the decision on 
turnover tax to allow all East German states full access on the same per capita basis that West 
German states had.  Moreover, Bonn responded with a new program, Aufschwung Ost, which 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
reform. Ziblatt shows that in the face of electoral challenges from the PDS, both states defected from this initial 
coalition (p. 35). 
26 Scholarship on post-unification reforms includes Färber, 2003; Renzsch, 1991, 1994; Burchardt, 1992; Hüther, 
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provided about 12 billion DM a year in 1991 and 1992 for new investment and employment in 
Eastern Germany.
28  Thus, the situation early in the reunification period was that the Eastern 
states had partial access to pieces of the old system plus a series of special programs to help with 
their special problems.  Yet the entire FRG still looked ahead anxiously to 1995 when it would 
see the new states come into the real LFA system, whether reformed or not.  Yet as we see in 
Table 1, which summarizes the three formal and one ad hoc stages of LFA, only minor changes – 
the addition of level three – in the overall structure of the system were enacted in 1995. At that 
time, the system was renewed until 2005.  This raises the key question: who footed the bill for 
extending a staggeringly expensive LFA to the five new states? 
 
Table 1:  The Stages of the Burdensharing Scheme in the FRG 
Stage  Mechanism  Measure of financial 
strength 
Goal and 1999 
transfer sums 
One: horizontal 
Redistribution among 
Länder of 25% of 
Länder's share of VAT. 
Per capita tax income, 
Excludes: VAT 
income, local 
governments' income, 
city-state population 
weighting. 
All Länder should 
reach 92% of average 
income.  Transfers: 
DM 15.4 billion 
Two: horizontal  Cash transfers from 
richer to poorer Länder 
Per capita tax income, 
Includes: VAT income, 
50% of local 
governments' income, 
and city-states' 
population weighted at 
135%. 
All Länder should 
reach 92% of average 
income.  Transfers: 
DM 14.6 billion 
Three: vertical (this 
step added in 1995) 
Cash transfers from 
Bund to poorer or 
needier Länder 
As in stage two. 
All Länder should 
reach 99.5% of 
average income.  
Transfers: DM 6.5 
billion 
After the 
Equalization: vertical 
Cash transfers from 
Bund to poorer or 
needier Länder 
Ad hoc determination 
of need. 
Varies.  Transfers:  
DM 19.3 billion, with 
nearly 2/3 going to 
eastern Länder, the 
rest to poorer western 
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Länder. 
 
Source: Adelberger (2000, p. 68); Vesper (1996, tables 1-3); Margedant (2001, p. 21). 
 
The answer, it turned out, was mostly the federal government.  In order to make possible 
the inclusion of the five new states, the federal government agreed to pay the lion’s share of the 
costs.
29  Indeed, most of the financially weaker Western states were guaranteed the extension or 
even the improvement of conditions under which they had access to LFA monies.  There were 
some changes in the way richer states paid into the system, but on the side of the recipients, 
nothing significant in the formula changed.  Thus, instead of using the financial crisis for 
fundamental reforms, virtually no reforms were undertaken.  Instead, the federal government 
greatly increased its direct payments to states.  Where prior to unification, the federal 
government’s vertical payments had been about 60% of the land-governments’ horizontal ones, 
by 1992 vertical transfers had already outstripped the horizontal transfers.  Yet this jump was 
nothing compared to what was coming next: as we can see from table 2, vertical redistribution 
jumped almost 500% by 1995 (from less than 5 billion DM per year in the early 1990s to around 
25 billion DM from 1995 on).  The vast majority of the new vertical transfers went to East 
German states, although vertical transfers to West German states almost doubled during this 
period from around four billion DM to around seven billion DM.  In subsequent years, federal 
                                                             
29 I follow Renzsch and Adelberger in emphasizing federal payments, though it should be noted that Färber and 
Sauckel (2000) emphasize that the federal government used its agenda setting power and ability to disguise some 
taxes to get a better deal than is widely believed. For a discussion of the extensive new powers (and burdens) of the 
federal government in other policy areas, see Czada and Wollman, 2000 and Jacoby, 2005. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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exposure has stayed high, and the most recent data (2004) showed it at just over 30 billion DM.
30 
The old states didn’t get off easy – their horizontal redistribution increased steeply as well (see 
Figure 2.1), though far less in absolute terms than did the federal government’s exposure. 
Source: Adelberger (2000, p. 71) 
 
What political maneuverings produced this deal?
31  Essentially, the rich states feared that 
the poor states would form a coalition with the federal government – the old political 
constellation of the 1950s and 1960s.  And once again, they tried to head off that possibility by 
offering the poor states a revenue-sharing deal as attractive as that the federal government’s 
initial offer.  Because the richer states proposed that the federal government absorb much of the 
cost, they were especially generous to the five East German states, offering them about 120% of 
average per capita taxes.  And despite having complained all the way to the constitutional court 
                                                             
30 15.042 billion Euros.  Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen, “Der Bundesstaatliche Finanzausgleich,” 
February 2005, p. 20. See also Färber, op. cit., p. 60. 
Figure 2.1:  Transfers in the Burdensharing Arrangement, 1970-1998:  
Federal Role Has Greatly Expanded
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in the late 1980s, the rich states offered to retain most of the old privileges that the West German 
city states and the poor West German states had previously enjoyed in order to get their 
agreement to the 1995 reform.  Given the veto positions of these states, it was difficult to get 
them on board unless they received much of what they had before.
32  Of the old poor states, only 
one (Schleswig-Holstein) moved from a net recipient to a net payer between 1995 and 1999 (and 
that only in the years 1995 and 1997). In the same period, Bremen and Lower Saxony’s revenues 
were up slightly over 1994 (the last year of the old system) while those of Rhineland-Palatinate 
and Saarland were down slightly.
33 
  Yet each layer of actors had their reasons for going along.  Communities might struggle 
more against such buck-passing if they were seen as partially responsible for the taxation levels. 
But they are not, and indeed communities have not generally pushed harder for more authority 
over taxation.
34  Meanwhile, the poorer West German states accepted the inclusion of the Eastern 
states even when it did cost them some revenue from the LFA because they were able to get the 
federal government to make special-payments that softened this blow. Given that they had to 
make some contribution to financing German unity, the poorer Western states and the Eastern 
states agreed to resist the richer states’ desires to reduce the amount of redistribution.
35  Finally, 
Kohl’s government had made such a commitment to the Fund for German Unity that it couldn’t 
easily accept the breakdown of the system that paid for it, so ultimately it felt compelled to go 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
31 Recent sources here include Adelberger, 2001; Renzsch, 1996, 1997, 2001; Schneider, 1999; Vesper, 1996, 1998; 
Gunlicks, 2000; Ziblatt, 2001; Färber 2003; and Färber and Sauckel, 2000.  
32 The one countertrend came when the federal state was able to push off some costs onto the old states (and their 
communities) by cutting programs for which they had previously paid.  Yet because of the structure of German 
institutions, the federal government was only able to cut in areas where the existing states had no statutory 
requirement to spend because otherwise the Bundesrat could stop the government from making the cuts.  In short, 
the FRG’s institutional system encourages buck-passing in which the federal government passes onto the states what 
in the United States would be called unfunded mandates (Posner, 1998).  The states, in turn, often pass those onto 
their own communities.  The communities have the weakest institutional foundation to resist such mandates.   
33 Färber 2003, p. 59. 
34 Färber and Sauckel, 2000, pp. 685-86. 
35 Ibid., pp. 689-90. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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along with the bulk of the rich states’ proposal.   
  This pattern – minor concessions by current recipients coupled with increased federal 
payments – was repeated in negotiations in June 2001.  Even though only six states now pay into 
the LFA (while ten are beneficiaries), the sides were able to reach an agreement to extend the 
LFA system from 2005 through 2019.
36  Two institutional factors pushed the states toward a 
deal: first, the Constitutional Court had ordered the parties to find a more just system in response 
to the suit brought by Bavaria, Baden-Württemberg, and Hesse.  Second, if the state governments 
could not broker a unanimous deal, maneuvering would shift to the Bundestag, where all parties 
would be involved and a plurality would suffice.  After regulating the system for four years 
(1991-95) and then ten more (1995-2005), the states moved to strike a long-term bargain.  As 
one might expect given the implicit backing of the court, the richer states did do better.  They 
achieved a new rule that allows them to keep the first 12% of revenues over the national average, 
and they also achieved a cap on their total contribution.  Bavaria will gain an estimated 200 
million DM per year from these new arrangements.  Yet, the poorer states of Western and 
Eastern Germany did not lose the benefits they had formalized during the 1995 negotiations.  
Instead, when the negotiations seemed in trouble, the federal Chancellor stepped in with a 
package of 13 billion DM to compensate the poorer states for the funds the richer would be 
allowed to retain.  This means that even a poor state such as Bremen will get an additional 70 
million DM per year more than under the prior system.  According to recent calculations of the 
Bavarian Ministry of Finance, new rules in 2005 will allow Bavaria to keep about 44 Euros out 
of every extra 100 Euros of tax revenues as compared to only 32 Euros under the system that 
prevailed up to 2004. North-Rhine Westphalia profits even more (it keeps 59 Euros rather than 
                                                             
36 Details in this section are drawn from various German press sources and from interviews in Germany in May and 
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44), while Baden-Württemberg (37 versus 30) and Hessen (32 versus 21) also benefit from the 
new system.
37 
  This was an expensive accord for the federal government.  The parties agreed to fund the 
Aufbau Ost program with 306 billion DM over the same period (the LFA, Aufbau Ost, and Fund 
for German Unity will all run until 2019 under this new deal).  The same electoral calculations 
that pushed Schröder to guarantee the system’s liquidity probably also helped moderate the 
position of at least one richer state.  Bavaria’s Prime Minister was then positioning for a run at 
the Chancellorship in 2002 and thus was not inclined to play hardball during these negotiations.  
He did, however, make clear that Bavaria wishes an end to the system of joint tasks and mixed 
financing regularized in the 1969 reforms.  Instead, Stoiber argued that a clear division of 
competencies between federal, state, and European levels is required.
38  But whatever remains to 
be clarified in terms of competencies, the main responsibility to pay has clearly lain with the 
federal state, with the richer states seeing smaller increases in their exposure, and the poor West 
German states making very little contribution at all.  The ultimate burden, of course, lies with the 
German taxpayers, East and West.  Annual deficits have been rising (14 billion Euros in 1980 
but 24 billion in 1990 and 32 billion in 2005) while total debt reached nearly 1.5 trillion Euro at 
the end of 2005, of which nearly 60% was federal. In comparison, total debt in 1990 was 536 
billion Euros, of which only about 50% was federal.
39 
  Importantly, while the fiscal system in Germany has few active defenders, it remains very 
difficult to envision a thoroughgoing reform. As noted, major elements of the architecture are 
entrenched in deals cut in the past decade. Notably, when in October 2003, the government 
                                                             
37 Bayerisches Staatsministerium der Finanzen, 2005, p. 27. 
38 Bavaria has been joined in this argument by one other richer state, North-Rhine Westphalia (NRW).  Bavaria and 
NRW are the only two states to progress from net recipients to net donors, but NRW had earlier refused to join the 
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established a special “Federalism Commission” to propose clearer division of responsibilities 
among the various levels of government, the Commission did not touch the LFA system. It was 
widely argued that an already contentious set of discussions would become unmanageable if it 
were included. The mayor of Bremen noted with satisfaction that the Commission “would not 
change one word” of the deal that runs until 2019.
40 Thus, an old side payment dating back to the 
1950s ran from Bonn to the poor western states and was quickly followed by a second side 
payment from the strong states to the weak ones that was designed to minimize federal influence 
over state prerogatives.  When unification came, both sets of side payments continued more or 
less intact even as the federal government in particular had to also come up with funds for a new 
set of recipients – the poor cousins from Eastern Germany.
41 So while the legitimacy of the 
current system may be low, its institutional anchoring is quite high. We turn now to the second 
case. 
 
   
The EU Structural Funds: Solidarity and Side Payments 
 The EU provides structural funds to help co-finance (usually at the level of 50%) projects to 
promote regional economic priorities inside its member states. In recent years, the two central 
priorities of the EU's regional policy have been to reduce existing economic and social 
disparities between regions and to reduce unemployment in the EU's weakest regions.
42 The EU's 
structural and cohesion funds contribute financially to the regional policies of the member states 
as they try to create appropriate conditions for investment and job-creation. While the member 
states retain the responsibility for defining their development priorities, the co-financing role of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
39 Der Spiegel, 19/2006: 23-30. 
40 Henning Scherf, as quoted in http://www.frankfurter-hefte.de/gespraech/gespraech/_04_1_2.html 
41 Note that by the definition used here, payments to the eastern Länder are the direct object of bargaining with the 
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the EU requires that individual projects take account of the European dimension of economic and 
social development.  For the period 2000-06, the Commission set as priorities regional 
competitiveness, social cohesion and employment, and the development of urban and rural 
areas.
43 
  EU spending on regional policy accounts for over a third of its total spending and trails 
only the Common Agricultural Policy in budgetary importance.
44  The total size of the four EU 
regional funds is currently capped at 0.46% of EU GDP, which translates into around 231 billion 
Euros between 2000-2006.  Most of this – 182 billion Euros – is in the structural funds. This is 
set to increase to 308 billion Euros (247 billion in the structural funds) between 2007-2013.  The 
structural funds have been around for nearly as along as the Community itself, but they grew 
significantly beginning in the middle of the 1980s as a result of pressure from Greece, Spain, and 
Portugal to help them develop at a time when the Commission was pushing the Single European 
Act.
45  Among other things, the funds are, therefore, a side payment to make countries capable of 
participating in a broader and wider single market.  Of course, they are also a measure to boost 
consumption in poor areas, to redistribute income, to promote the participation of sub-national 
governments in EU policymaking, and to manage the levels and kinds of state support to 
domestic industry.   
  This paper focuses not on these functions per se, but looks primarily at the struggle over 
access to the funds themselves.  The link to the first part of the paper is that in each case, a 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
42 On EU structural funds, see Hooghe, 1996 and Hooghe and Marks, 2001. On CEE states’ efforts to join these 
funds, see Jacoby, 2004; Jacoby and ￿ernoch, 2002. Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon, 2004. 
43 European Commission, 1999. Since 1988, the European Council has developed multi-year “financial 
perspectives” that set overall EU budget levels in ways that avoid annual budget showdowns. The current financial 
perspective expires in December 2006, and in April 2006, the EU agreed on a new financial perspective that will 
increase funding for both the structural and cohesion funds. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/financial_perspective/cohesion/index_en.htm. 
44 Declining to about 33% in 2006, given the 1999 absolute cap on structural funds spending. 
45 Mayhew, 1999, p. 283; Hooghe and Marks, 2001, pp. 106-07. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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system that used side payments that increased financial solidarity and had a long-term and 
largely stable set of richer and poorer states has had to confront the reality that the arrival of poor 
cousins threatens to shift some states from being net recipients to becoming net payers.  What 
does this do to the original side payments? In the EU case, the long-term recipients of structural 
funds have been Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland.  In all of these states, structural fund 
receipts were above 2% of GDP for most of the 1990s.
46  While all other EU members (including 
the wealthiest) have access to some structural fund monies, in none of them does the total 
magnitude come close to 2% (Italy is the next closest with 1.7%, concentrated mostly in the 
South).  Also important in this context is the so-called cohesion fund, started in 1993 in the wake 
of Maastricht, and devoted to improving the environment and transportation only in the four 
poorest member states (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain).  Co-financing demands here are 
less – only 10% from the recipient side.  The poorest regions in these states benefited further 
from the 1999 reforms that actually concentrated more spending on the weakest regions.
47  Thus, 
the poorest regions have, potentially, much to lose. 
My focus here is on the so-called “objective 1 regions.”
48  Objective 1 regions are those 
parts of member states where per capita GDP is less than 75% of the EU average.  Of course, 
even poor states may have some regions that are not objective 1.  For example, of Spain’s 17 
regions, 11 had objective 1 status during the 2000-2006 budget period.  Objective 1 regions 
absorbed about 74% of total structural fund spending (including the cohesion funds) during the 
budget period ending in 1999, and they absorbed about 70% of structural funds during the 2000-
                                                             
46 In terms of percentage of GDP, Luxembourg actually receives the most EU funding, though relatively little of that 
comes from the structural funds. It is followed by Greece, Portugal, and the three Baltic States. In net terms (gross 
receipts minus contributions), Spain is the EU’s largest recipient followed by Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Poland 
(2004 data) (BBC September 22, 2005). 
47 Hooghe and Marks, 2001, p. 107.  Hooghe and Marks (pp. 112-13) argue convincingly that an ideological conflict  
– between proponents of neoliberalism and regulated capitalism – overlays the territorial dispute I emphasize.  
48 The new member states have also been granted access to the cohesion funds. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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2006 period. 
  It should not surprise us to learn that the structural funds long made up a significant 
portion of the four poorest member states’ fixed capital formation and GDP.  On average, in 
1993, 6% of total investment in these states was financed by the structural funds.
49  By 1999, that 
figure had grown to 7.8% of all gross fixed capital formation.  The percentage was highest in 
Greece, where by 1999 it reached almost 13%.  In the other three countries, Spain, Ireland and 
Portugal, it ran from 7-8% in 1999.  Similarly, the structural fund has grown important in GDP 
terms in all four countries.  On average in 1989, structural fund spending equaled 1.6% of GDP 
in these four states.  By 1993, it was 2.3% of GDP and by 1999, 2.9% of GDP.  By contrast, in 
all other EU member states, the percentage of fixed capital investment coming from the 
structural funds was only 2.5%, and the percentage of GDP was 1.1%.
50  This is a significant 
prize to protect, and moreover, it was a prize provided originally as a way to help induce the 
participation of the poor countries in the increased competition of a single market. Spain has led 
the diplomatic fight to preserve structural fund spending for current recipients rather than be 
more generous towards the poor cousins.  The final section of this paper thus looks at the 
diplomatic maneuvering that has made the poor cousins feel less than welcome. 
   
Reforming the EU Structural Funds: Old Poor States versus New Poor Cousins  
It is well known that the GDP levels of the ten new member states are far below those of the old 
EU-15.  Using 2000 data, the EU-15 average GDP per capita at PPP was $23,133 (with the low 
in Portugal at $15,800) while in the new members the average was $8,440 (with a high in the 
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Czech Republic of $12,900).
51 Eurostat figures from the 2000-2002 period show that in the new 
members over 92% of the population lived in regions with a GDP per capita under 75% of the 
EU25 average. At that time, Within the old EU15, only 14% of the population still lived in 
regions below 75% of the EU average. In the new members, 61% of the population lived in 
regions below 50%; in the former EU15 countries, no region fell below this level.
52 
  What would it mean to add these very poor countries to the existing system?  The answer 
depended upon the rules the EU used to add the countries.  Some rules seemed discredited from 
the start. For example, if one had simply extended the then-current per capita spending from the 
structural funds in existing objective 1 regions, then the ten new members would have been 
slated to receive a whopping 30 billion Euros per year.
53  This would then have represented 
about 85% of the total annual spending of the funds and would obviously have had to come out 
of the hide of existing recipients or of existing payers (who would have been obliged to pay even 
more). Even if the EU had dropped the level of per capita spending to the level received by the 
eastern German states -- 174 Euros per person, per year -- the new EU member states would have 
absorbed over 18 billion Euros annually.  Instead of being 85% of the entire structural funds 
budget, that would have represented 51% of the structural funds budget in the 2000-2006 
period.
54  Both options were thus politically unworkable.  
  Meanwhile, many experts also argued that these new members could not quickly 
“absorb” substantial funding and proposed various forms of caps on the percentage of GDP that 
                                                             
51 Central Intelligence Agency, 2001. 
52 EU Commission, “Latest European regional statistics confirm Commission’s proposal on Structural Funds for 
2007-2013.” January 28, 2005. http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/107& 
format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.  
53 This is on the assumption of an ECU transfer per capita of 289 Euros per year, per person in objective 1 regions.   
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any one new member could receive in a given year.
55 The justification for such cap proposals – 
which drew much criticism from the prospective new members – were the significant 
administrative difficulties in starting up new structural fund programs, identifying projects, and 
providing the requisite co-financing.  In addition, it was said that too much rapid investment 
might bring macroeconomic distortions. 
  Against this background, the EU-15 needed to negotiate a final deal with the accession 
countries, a deal that would allow the new members to join in time for the European 
Parliamentary elections scheduled for the summer of 2004. In the various negotiations that led up 
the final deal – and indeed in subsequent negotiations that continue up to the present moment – 
the old recipients of structural funds have been keen to protect their access to payments even as 
new payments flowed to the accession countries. No country has been more determined in this 
endeavor than has Spain. Spain quickly emerged as the leading diplomatic opponent of financing 
poorer CEE states out of the same pot that financed the poor member states.
56 
  Spain has a rich recent history of raising to the level of high national drama the political 
bargains over the structural funds – a subject reserved for policy wonks in many other European 
countries. Felipe Gonzales, the socialist prime minister of Spain throughout the 1980s, is still 
remembered for having stared down past German attempts to cut structural funds to Spain.  Such 
maneuvering seems common regardless of the partisan composition of the Madrid government. 
Both the Conservative Aznar governments and the current Socialist Zapatero government have 
shared two sets of tactics.  First, they have sought to establish a new set of criteria that would 
                                                             
55 Mayhew (1999, p. 291) makes this argument as did many of the people I have interviewed in the region in the past 
few years (Rozsa, Blažek, Černoch, Dupal, Červený). 
56 There is anecdotal evidence that Portugal and Greece were happy to see Spain take the lead in these deliberations, 
but I need to follow up on this claim in order to substantiate it. Ironically, Spain was a net contributor to the EU 
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keep many of their regions eligible
57, and second, they have threatened to blockade other EU 
policies.   
In terms of new criteria, Spanish officials have emphasized, above all, the “statistical 
effect,” in which the poor nations admitted to the EU have brought down the average per capita 
GDP, pushing old Objective 1 regions above the 75% threshold in the process.  As Conservative 
Foreign Minister Josep Piqué stated in 2001, “If we don’t come to a prior solution about the so-
called ‘statistical effect,’ the expansion will push an artificial and automatic shift that would be 
gravely prejudicial to current beneficiaries of the Cohesion Funds.” Diplomat Juan de Dios 
Izquierdo was even more blunt: “[The Spanish regions] will continue to be equally poor, 
although statistically it won’t appear so….Either cohesion today for everybody and fulfillment of 
the pact, or political war.”
58   
Despite the fact that only two Spanish regions (Asturias and Murcia), were affected in 
this particular way, Spanish diplomats have consistently framed this as a major dilemma. To 
address it, Spain put forward several solutions.  One idea was to broaden eligibility from regions 
with less than 75% of the average GDP to those with less than 90% of the average.
59  Another 
was to use unemployment as the measuring stick for deciding when a region gets structural funds 
(Spanish unemployment remains high).  Yet a third proposal was to raise the overall ceiling on 
aid available from the 2000-2006 limit of .45% of EU GDP to perhaps .66%, which could have 
meant an extra 20 billion Euros per year.   
                                                             
57 They do so in the context of Madrid’s longstanding struggle to keep its own regions from participating in 
negotiations about the Structural Funds support framework. This dimension of the complex politics of Spanish 
regionalism is outside the scope of this paper. 
58 Both quotations in this paragraph are from Yárnoz, 2001b. 
59 “Europe: What’s Ours is Ours.”  The Economist.  May 26, 2001.  Volume 359: 47-48. waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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The key problem has been that the Germans – the EU’s largest net payer – have liked 
none of these options.
60  In part, German anger is understandable when one considers how few 
Spanish regions are really hurt by the statistical effect. The population of the two regions so 
affected is just over two million or about 5.4% of total Spanish population.
61 The German SPD 
has, in fact, proposed returning regional policy largely to national control, and aides to then-
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer were furious about last-minute Spanish demands during the all-
night bargaining during the last day of the Nice summit.
62  For their part, Spain blames Germany 
for wanting to take away their funds.  For example, Izquierdo maintains that the most developed 
nations of the EU benefit most from the union, and notes that Spain imports about 1 billion 
pesetas worth of automobiles from Germany each year.  In addition, much of the Spanish 
infrastructure improved through the cohesion funds ultimately benefits the German industries 
from which they buy machinery and technology.
63  This argument leads directly to a second one, 
already familiar from the first part of this paper: the German federal government should foot a 
large part of any bill for expanding the current system. 
The second tactic involved policy blockades. Most notably, in 2001, Aznar’s Foreign 
Ministry announced that Spain was only willing to compromise on the structural funds issue if 
Germany would compromise on the issue of immigration controls within the EU.
64   At that time, 
Chancellor Schröder was trying to broker a seven-year moratorium on free movement of labor from 
accession countries because many German voters, especially in border regions of Eastern Germany 
                                                             
60 In 2000, Germany’s net contribution to the EU was 9.3 billion Euros. The other net contributors had far smaller 
balances: Britain (3.8 billion), Netherlands (1.7 billion), France (1.4 billion), Sweden (1.2 billion), and Austria, 
Belgium and Luxembourg all with less than one billion Euros. 
61 Schmidt-Seiwert, 2004. 
62 Interviews in the German Foreign Ministry. Until I can clear these, I’m not using direct quotations or names. 
63 Yárnoz, 2001b. 
64 Indeed, Germany’s Wirtschaftswoche (November 29, 2001, p. 47) claimed that the price for Spanish agreement to 
Germany’s plan for immigration controls was that Germany guarantee that Spain suffer no loss of structural funds 
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and Bavaria feared being swamped with immigrants.  Spanish leaders understand that this issue was 
only politically significant in Germany and Austria and skillfully used it to block other reforms, 
including those of the structural and cohesion funds.
65  Despite German efforts to move toward 
agreement on reforming the funds, Spanish officials insisted that the two issues were inseparable, 
and any negotiation on one front must produce satisfaction on the other.  Conservative Minister of 
Economics Rodrigo Rato argued, “If there are countries that bring up concerns about the process of 
expansion, like those that are worried about the circulation of people, there can also be others that 
have justified problems with respect to the statistic effect produced by the expansion.” Piqué noted 
that “Spain can be flexible in its negotiations if other nations are flexible.”
66  For German Finance 
Minister Hans Eichel, Spain crossed the line between blockade and blackmail.
67 
In the end, these 2002 negotiations brought many disappointments for CEE states. In 
particular, the EU-15’s determination to stay within the bounds of the 2000-2006 financial 
perspective meant that for the period 2004-2006, only very limited funds would flow to the new 
members. Moreover, when the EU-15 took this decision in 1999, it was widely assumed that only 
six states would qualify for membership during this period. When it was decided in 2002 to admit 
ten, this meant that the same amount of money had to cover four more countries.
68 The 21.6 billion 
Euros in structural and cohesion funds allocated to all of CEE for the 2004-06 period is roughly 
similar to what Portugal alone received in the 2000-2006 period, a time during which Spain 
received about 55 billion Euros.  In short, the final deal on the structural funds was not generous. 
Indeed, as noted earlier, the combined agricultural and structural funds receipts for some CEE new 
                                                             
65 Yárnoz, 2001a. 
66 Yárnoz, 2001c. 
67 “Europe: What’s Ours is Ours.”  The Economist.  May 26, 2001.  Volume 359: 47-48. 
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members were so low that the EU created a special “payment facility” to add new monies so that no 
new member state would immediately be a net contributor to the EU budget.   
CEE complaints about the side of the structural funds package were heard immediately. In 
November 2002, the finance ministers of 13 candidate countries released a statement expressing 
their concern that the EU’s final offer included funding that the candidates would be unlikely to be 
able to use given the EU’s complex rules. The ministers worried that these monies would then be 
redirected away the CEE states.
69 As it happened, the new members have been able to contract 
projects covering virtually 100% of their allotted funds for 2004, though it is important to note that 
some projects may not be realized in ways that would allow Brussels to transfer the allotted 
monies.
70 
Meanwhile, Spain continued to press its own case, which occasionally brought it into direct 
conflict with the new members. For example, Spanish diplomats overcame the strong objections of 
Polish, Czech, Slovakian, and Hungarian officials to remove key language from a joint EU 
document prepared for the budget summit in December 2004. The deleted language had 
emphasized solidarity as an important principle for the distribution of cohesion funds during the 
2007-2013 budget period and called explicitly for efforts to help the new members reach average 
EU levels of economic development.
71  
In confronting these conflicts, some additional money has been proposed by the 
Commission, specifically an increase in structural and cohesion funds for 2007-2013 to 336 billion 
Euros. However, this is just a request, and the European Council is widely expected to approve a 
smaller figure when and if it approves a new financial perspective. Still, it seems like the new 
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members will see an increase over the truly modest annual allocations they will receive in the first 
two yeas of membership. That said, the Commission has also called for regions hit by the statistical 
effect to be “phased out” of the funds, rather than dropped altogether. The terms proposed are 85% 
funding for the first two years followed by 5% annual drops throughout the rest of the budget 
period to 2013. In all, the EU Commission has proposed spending about 22 billion Euros on the 
“statistically ejected” regions (not just Spanish) between 2007-2013.
72  
Meanwhile, CEE states have continued to worry about the cap on structural funds as a 
percentage of GDP. The EU set this cap at 4%, which the CEE states have now grudgingly 
accepted, but they continue to insist that the formula used to calculate their GDP understates the 
real size of their economy and thus diminished the size of funds for which they are eligible.
73 The 
flexibility and phase out issues came together when the Luxembourg presidency drafted a 
“compromise” plan for the EU budget, which guaranteed the phase-out desired by Spain but 
rejected calls by the new member states for “flexibility” in interpreting the cap rules.  The Czech 
representative spoke for many others when he publicly denounced the proposal as a “giant step 
backwards.”
74 A short time later, the European Parliament followed the Commission on the 
flexibility issue. Czech MEP Jan Brezina called the EP majority’s decision “a move of arrogance 
and also a huge political mistake.”
75 
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Conclusions: Side Payments, Not Solidarity 
In terms of financial solidarity, there remains a significant difference between being a federal 
system and a quasi-federal one. Institutions, not affection, seem to have driven the policy choices 
above. In turn, a central finding of this paper is that these are systems of side payments more 
than of solidarity. The Eastern Länder did not get a generous deal because their compatriots were 
strongly inclined toward solidarity; instead their actions and rhetoric look quite a bit like the 
moves of the EU “old poor” in trying to preserve their Structural Fund monies. In both cases, the 
old weak recipients did well. The old poor German states continued to receive most of the prior 
benefits they had enjoyed, while the old poor EU states have not, so far, paid much of a price for 
enlargement. Both sets of states used their insider location and the corresponding veto positions 
they enjoyed to shape the terms under which new states would enter the two systems of financial 
solidarity. In both cases, old sets of side payments were largely continued. In the German case, 
they were formally reaffirmed until 2019, while in the EU case, they are insulated until 2013.
76 
  If the old poor states largely kept what they’d had, then the two sets of poor cousins could 
only benefit if someone else paid. The key in both cases was whether the political center of the 
respective systems had the fiscal flexibility to engage in deficit financing. In the German case, 
the strong states and the old poor ones ganged up on the center (the federal government). The 
poor cousins in Eastern Germany profited as a result. The center found it impossible to resist, in 
no small part because the electoral dynamic in Eastern Germany made voters there crucial to 
both major parties in three successive elections.
77 In Germany, the addition of the new Eastern 
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units was made at the central political level, so the inclusion of these poor cousins was, with the 
signing of the Unity Treaty, inevitable. The old units could shape the conditions of entry, but 
realistically they could not say “no.”  This deal strengthened the hand of the poor cousins from 
Eastern Germany. 
  In the EU case, by contrast, both the old wealthy and the old poor states ganged up on the 
poor cousins. The center – the EU Commission, which is the primary EU institution tasked with 
pushing national interests to the periphery – could not help them; it lacked both the authority and 
resources to do so without the member states, who controlled the broad contours of the 
enlargement process and had a firm cap on the budgetary process that was valid until the end of 
2006.  Unlike in Germany, the addition of new units required the consent of the old units – a 
consent that was not given until 2004 and that allowed the old units to put strict conditions on 
entry and limit their exposure to any revenue losses.  In short, two features mattered a great deal: 
electoral ties across levels of government and the taxation/borrowing limits on federal actors. 
The German federal government had the capacity to step in to bridge a funding gap when the 
German old poor were not forthcoming, and Bonn/Berlin also had the motivation to do so 
because the respective governments wanted to build their political support for national-level 
elections. In the EU, “federal actors” like the Commission had neither the capacity for funding 
nor little motivation to provide it if it had to come from existing resources. 
The 2007-2013 period should treat the CEE states somewhat better. Total spending for 
the structural funds is, as noted, now set to increase, as is the percentage of those funds that will 
go to the poorest recipients (from around 70% of total spending to nearly 80%). Since the new 
members fall almost entirely into this poorer category, they will benefit disproportionately from 
such a shift. But the disparities have been stark: In 2004, 93.5% of EU spending went to the old waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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EU15, with only 6.5% going to the new members despite the fact that their population was 
16.3% of the EU. Spain remains, by some distance, the leading recipient of EU funds with 
almost 16.5 billion Euros (17.8% of the budget), followed by France, Germany, and Italy (with 
14, 13, and 11% respectively). The largest recipient in the new member states was, of course, 
Poland, but it received only 3% of EU funds. By comparison, Ireland, which received slightly 
more gross funding, has a population of 4 million compared to 38 million in Poland. And though 
Poland has virtually the same amount of agricultural area as France, French farmers receive 
roughly 30 times as much CAP support as Polish ones.
78 
  One might respond that it is early, and in due time, the poor cousins will find access to 
more EU monies. At one level, this seems likely, as noted by the 2007-2013 figures. But if things 
could get better, they could also get worse. For example, it is less than certain that the current 
Structural Fund programs will be durable. Where the rich German states cannot easily escape the 
solidarity system – and so had to make some contribution to extending the LFA – the British 
case shows that richer EU states can make a credible threat to diminish or even dismantle the 
structural funds system. Where the Spanish have fought tenaciously to defend the current system, 
the British seem to accept that relatively few of their regions would receive much continued 
funding – only Cornwall – and thus seek to shrink the program.
79 If they do – and the Germans, 
Swedes, and Dutch have made favorable comments about variants of the “renationalization” 
plans for the structural funds – then this would be another blow to the financial aspirations of the 
poor cousins. 
  Sympathy and solidarity seem to play little role in these debates. Spain is a country 
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without a single important anti-EU political party and where Euro-skepticism has been small, 
disorganized, and ad hoc.
80  Nevertheless, Spain has maneuvered to hang on to structural fund 
allocations that might otherwise go to even poorer CEE states.  Taken together with the earlier 
evidence from the politics of LFA reform in Germany, there can be little doubt that recipient 
states have fought to maintain existing benefits, even in the face of clear evidence that other 
states are much worse off.  This pattern apparently holds true even when the funds are explicitly 
to promote solidarity by compensating for the inequalities of market outcomes.   
  Of course, it can hardly surprise anyone that politicians who must run for reelection 
struggle to protect resources for their constituencies.  A more intriguing picture emerges, 
however, when we return to the claim that the “solidarity fund” in both the inner-German and 
inner-European cases is really more a system of side-payments than of solidarity per se.  These 
tax and development policies are embedded in a larger logic of state and market making that 
spans several decades and highlights the struggle for resources and control among various levels 
of government, perhaps more levels than the dominant state-building literature has heretofore 
emphasized.  Indeed, we have seen in this paper that policy reforms are fought out between 
community, state, national, and European levels. 
  In Germany, the stronger states tried to help the weaker states in order to ward off the 
central state’s influence on them.  They found, to their consternation, that the weaker states took 
help from both sides, and so, as a second step, the strong states proposed areas of joint decision 
making and federal-state cofinancing.  In so doing, they acknowledged the inroads the federal 
state had made into certain policy areas, but they tried to control those inroads, and at the same 
time found an avenue for securing some funding from the central state in their own right.  Both 
sets of side payments ultimately made the system impervious to major reforms, but it also made 
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the system unworkable in Eastern Germany unless one actor stepped forward to pay for it.  The 
electoral weight of the Eastern voters in 1990, 1995, and 2001 has been sufficient for the federal 
state to make this very expensive investment.  It has done so, moreover, under both center-right 
and center-left coalitions, suggesting that ideological factors are not the key explanatory variable.  
Rather, the key was a shift in the bargaining strategy of the richer states in about 1995 when they 
moved from open hostility to net recipients in both the West and the East to propose a settlement 
generous to all the states because it was substantially paid for with Berlin’s money.  By framing 
a new possibility for a cross-state coalition, the richer states foiled the predictions of experts who 
argued that subsequent reforms were likely to see burdens shift from Berlin to the richer states.
81 
Indeed, the big question is whether “subsequent reform” will even happen at all. With the 
financial basis for this costly set of side payments now set until 2019, one wonders just how 
much disaffection would be required to push through some kind of reform. 
  The side-payments in the EU case resulted from the decision of the Commission, backed 
by important member states, to accelerate the market-building aspect of the Community in the 
mid-1980’s.
82  In order to allay fears in the less developed member states, the EC significantly 
expanded the funds available for regional development.  These monies raised confidence that 
even if the market’s greater scope benefited some Europeans in a disproportional way, some of 
those benefits would be made available to the Community’s poorest regions.  Even though the 
redistribution targets never came anywhere near the 99% achieved in the LFA system, they were 
significant in their impact on both investment and consumption.  And they have proved just as 
hard to reform.   
  That said, there is more evidence here than in the LFA case that the side payments may 
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be vulnerable. In particular, as the eastern German states and several UK regions have outgrown 
the 75% threshold for Objective 1 regions, these important net contributors to the EU budget 
have each raised the specter of a renationalization of regional policy. Each has been careful to 
note that some funds should continue to flow to the new members, and as we saw, the current 
UK proposal actually calls for the new members to have almost exclusive access to EU structural 
and cohesion funds. Such a scenario might be superficially appealing to CEE leaders, but one 
would have to wonder about the political durability of a system of funds that brought little direct 
benefit to the major underwriters of the EU budget. 
  In part, the EU has been unable to do what the federal government in Germany has done 
– strike a long term deal – because it has no independent powers of taxation.  In each crisis of 
fiscal equalization in Germany, the federal state has been able to draw upon general tax revenues 
to purchase the compliance of the recalcitrant states.  For decades, pareto optimal deals have 
been unavailable in German federalism, and side payments have been crucial in holding the 
system together.  The EU has no analogous general revenues from which to draw to overcome 
political blockades.  In this sense, the EU is more similar to the fiscal system of the original 
German Reich of 1870 than to the current German government.
83  Indeed, it is possible that the 
price for extending (largely unreformed) the German LFA system has diminished the long term 
sustainability of the EU structural funds. Obviously, Germany – as the EU’s largest net payer –
has to bear a large part of the burden of the structural funds. But the German government, having 
ponied up most of the money to extend one system of solidarity, feels it is in no position to do it 
again.  Absent a voice in the national elections of existing member states, the poor cousins of 
Eastern Europe have found significantly less solidarity than the poor cousins of Eastern 
Germany. Now that they are in the system, it will be fascinating to see how, if at all, their waj9  Page   ACES CASES 2006.2 
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fortunes change. 
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